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SUCCESSIONS, DONATIONS, AND COMMUNITY
PROPERTY
Harriet S. Daggett*
SUCCESSIONS
In Succession of Wilder1 the plaintiff opposed the final ac-
counting of the decedent's estate. She sought compensation
under the quantum meruit theory for various services which she
had performed for the decedent. Although she valued her serv-
ices at over $5,000, she limited her claim to $2,000 in view of
an annuity which the decedent had provided for her. The court
affirmed the trial judge in holding that the evidence did not
establish that the value of the services exceeded the value of the
annuity created by the decedent in favor of the plaintiff.
In Sparrow v. Sparrow2 the decedent's concubine sought to
be declared owner of one-half of the property listed in the inven-
tory of the decedent's succession. The evidence showed that the
plaintiff and the decedent had worked together in establishing
and operating the various businesses which composed the dece-
dent's entire estate. The plaintiff contended that a partnership
had existed between herself and the decedent and that she was
entitled to one-half of the assets of the partnership. The court
held that the primary purpose of the relationship was concubin-
age; therefore, no legal partnership could have existed since the
Code declares that partnerships formed for unlawful or immoral
purposes are void.3 The prior cases which allowed the concubine
or paramour to recover part of the property accumulated during
the relationship were distinguished on the ground that the con-
cubinage in those cases was merely incidental to the business
relationship. The writer of the dissenting opinion argued that
the business relationship of the parties should be treated separ-
ately from their personal relationship as concubine and para-
mour.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. The work of William H. Cook,
Jr., staff member of the Louisiana Law Review, in the preparation of these ma-
terials is gratefully acknowledged.
1. 282 La. 905, 95 So.2d 495 (1957).
2. 231 La. 966, 93 So.2d 232 (1957).
3. LA. Crvm CODE art. 2804 (1870).
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DONATIONS
Donations Inter Vivos
In Succession of Anderson4 the evidence showed that the de-
cedent had sold certain property to his son. The daughters of the
decedent brought an action to force their brother to collate the
excess value of this property in accordance with Article 1248 of
the Civil Code because the sale had been made for "a very low
price." The court held that the price which the son paid for the
land was not inadequate in view of the value of the land at the
time of the sale, and therefore no collation was due by the son.
In Weems v. Medak5 the husband and wife transferred cer-
tain community property to one of their daughters, reserving
the mineral rights thereto. After the death of the husband, his
widow transferred the mineral rights on the same property to
the daughter. The widow and the forced heirs of the deceased
husband now seek to be declared owners of this property and to
annul the oil leases which have been granted by the daughter.
Since it was admitted that no consideration was given for the
transfers, the purported sales were actually donations in dis-
guise. The forced heirs of the husband were allowed to annul
the donation of his one-half interest in the property under Ar-
ticle 1504 of the Civil Code. Therefore each of the six children
was recognized as owner of an undivided one-twelfth interest in
the property. The court also allowed the widow to annul the
donation of her one-half interest in the property because it left
her without means for her subsistence.6 However, the court held
that the widow's one-half interest and the defendant daughter's
one-twelfth interest in the property would remain subject to the
mineral lease granted by the defendant because they were par-
ties to the lease transaction.
In Succession of Quaglino7 the surviving widow and the
daughters of the decedent brought an action to annul certain
inter vivos transfers of stock certificates and real estate made
by decedent to his sons. The court found that the transfer of the
stock certificates was without consideration and therefore was a
pure simulation. Under Article 2239 of the Civil Code, the forced
heirs were allowed to annul this simulated transfer made by
4. 231 La. 195, 91 So.2d 8 (1956).
5. 231 La. 923, 93 So.2d 217 (1957).
6. LA. Cxv CoDE art. 1498 (1870).
7. 232 La. 870, 95 So.2d 481 (1957).
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their father. As to the real estate, the court held that the trans-
fer was not a simulation since some consideration had been given
for the transfer. 8 Nor was the consideration so inadequate as to
allow the transfer to be considered a donation in disguise.9
In Spiers v. Davidson'° the court held that the plaintiff's
petition, which alleged that a purported sale of land made by her
mother to her aunt was actually a simulation, had established
a cause of action under Article 2239 of the Civil Code. The
plaintiff should have been allowed to offer proof of her allega-
tions. The defendant argued that since the plaintiff had ac-
cepted her mother's succession unconditionally, she was bound
by her mother's warranty of title under Article 2236 of the
.Civil Code. In rejecting this argument, the court held that if
the forced heirs were bound by their ancestor's warranty of
title in an authentic act, they could never bring an action to
annul the simulated contracts of those from whom they inherit.
It would appear that the right given to the forced heirs in Ar-
ticle 2239 is an exception to the general rule that the heirs are
bound by the authentic acts of their ancestors under Article 2236
of the Civil Code.
Donations Mortis Causa
In Succession of Guillory" a resident of Texas left a will dis-
posing of property situated in Louisiana. The testament pro-
vided that the property should be held in trust for her son during
his lifetime, and at his death the naked ownership and the
possession of the property should go to a named religious or-
ganization in this state. The court held that the bequest was a
prohibited substitution and, therefore, unenforceable insofar as
it affected property in Louisiana.12
In Succession of Kamlade'3 an olographic will provided that
the testator's estate should be used for the support of his sister-
in-law and, at her death, should be divided so that one-half
would go to his cousins on his mother's side of the family and
one-half would go to his cousins on his father's side. The execu-
tors of the estate petitioned the court for a judgment, under the
8. Succession of Nelson, 224 La. 731, 70 So.2d 665 (1953) ; Citizens Bank
and Trust Co. v. Willis, 183 La. 127, 162 So. 822 (1935).
9. LA.. (Crvx CODE art. 2444 (1870).
10. 96 Se.2d 502 (La. 1957).
11. 232 La. 213, 94 So.2d 38 (1957).
12. LA. Crvu_ CODE art. 1520 (1870).
33. 232 Ia. 275, 94 So.2d 257 (1957).
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Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,14 declaring the testator's
intent as to the proper disposition of the estate between his
cousins. Since the sister-in-law predeceased the testator, the
question of whether or not the disposition was a prohibited sub-
stitution was moot because of Article 1697 of the Civil Code. In
rejecting the argument that the entire will should be declared
void because of uncertainty, the court said that it was bound
under Articles 1712 and 1713 of the Civil Code to give some
effect to the testament. Because of the uncertainty as to what
was meant by the word "cousins," the court sought an inter-
pretation which would most closely approximate the legal order
of distribution.15 The court held that the word "cousins" meant
the nearest surviving cousins on each side of the family, rather
than all of the testator's cousins regardless of degree. Therefore,
one-half of the estate was given to the first cousins on his
father's side of the family and the remaining half was given to
his second cousins on his mother's side as they were his nearest
surviving cousins.
In Succession of Mutin8 the validity of an olographic will
dated "Feb 2/9/54" was assailed under the claim that the date
was uncertain. After holding that the evidence introduced to
show the testator's intent as to the date could not be used to
clarify any uncertainty of date because such a nullity results
from a vice of form, the court found that the date was not un-
certain and that the will was valid. The court held that the
century and decade (1954) and the month of the year (February)
were explicit.1 7 The only question to decide was whether the
will was written on the second or on the ninth day of February.
The court held that some effect had to be given to each of the
numerals and it was reasonable to conclude that the will was
written on the ninth of February and that the number two (2)
was merely a repetition by figure of the month. It is believed
that the reader should distinguish this case from the cases which
hold that a will dated solely by slash marks leaves the date un-
certain.18 In this case the month of the year was clearly indi-
cated by the abbreviation of the word "February."
14. LA. R.S. 13:4231 et 8eq. (1950).
15. Succession of Williams, 132 La. 865, 61 So. 852 (1913) ; Burthe v. Dents,
31 La. Ann. 568 (1879).
16. 232 La. 416, 94 So.2d 421 (1957).
17. Succession of Kron, 172 La. 666, 135 So. 879 (1931). -But we 1948
amendment to LA. CIVIL CODE art. 70 (1870).
18. Succession of Beird, 145 La. 756, 82 So. 881 (1919) ; Succession of Las-
seigne, 181 So. 879 (La. App. 1938).
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In Succession of Moore19 the legal heirs of the decedent
brought an action to reduce a donation mortis causa, claiming
that the legatee and the testator had lived together in open con-
cubinage. 20 The evidence showed the the legatee had left her
husband and had taken up residence with the testator. The court
held that a relationship of concubinage existed between the par-
ties, as distinguished from mere acts of fornication or adultery.
Since no attempt was made to conceal their relationship, the
parties were deemed to have lived together in a state of open
concubinage. Therefore, in accordance with Article 1481 of the
Civil Code, the donation was reduced to one-tenth of the value
of the estate to be paid out of the movable property only.
In Succession of Lapene21 the plaintiffs were allowed to prove
their relationship to the testator by formal acts passed before
public officers in France. While it was admitted that such evi-
dence was secondary in nature, the court held that the evidence
was sufficient to establish the plaintiffs' rights to the estate
since it was the best evidence available upon which such proof
could be based. The court also held that the fact that more than
thirty years had elapsed since the death of the testator would not
prevent the legatees from asserting their claims to the estate.
The prescriptive period under Article 1031 of the Civil Code
cannot be invoked by the state in order to allow the land to
escheat to the state.22 Such prescription is available only to co-
heirs or their transferees who have accepted the succession.2
In Winsberg v. Winsberg24 the testator had disposed of his
entire estate in favor of his surviving spouse. By agreement,
this disposition was reduced to his disposable portion under
Article 1493 of the Civil Code, and his children were recognized
as owners of their forced share of their father's estate. The
question later arose as to whether the surviving spouse was
entitled to the usufruct over the property inherited by the chil-
dren of the marriage.2 5 The testator's son relied on the case of
ForstalZ v. Forstall,26 which denied the surviving spouse the
usufruct over the children's inheritance when she had received
19. 232 La. 56, 94 So.2d 666 (1957).
20. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1481 (1870).
21. 96 So.2d 321 (La. 1957).
22. Succession of Tyson, 186 La. 516, 173 So. 772 (1939).
23. Lee v. Jones, 224 La. 231, 69 So.2d 26. (1953) ; Sun Oil Co. v. Tarver,
219 La. 103, 53 So.2d 437 (1951).
24. 96 So.2d 33 (La. 1957).
25. See LA. Crvi CODE art. 916 (1870).
26. 28 La. Ann. 197 (1876).
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the disposable portion of her husband's estate. The court re-
fused to follow the Forstall decision and held that the usufruct
created by law in favor of the surviving spouse over the prop-
erty inherited by issues of the marriage would be recognized
whenever the testator had not disposed of his property adversely
to the usufruct. Since no mention of the usufruct was made in
the testament, the court held that the testator had not intended
to deprive his widow of the legal usufruct over the children's
inheritance.
In Talton v. Todd27 the collateral heirs of the testator at-
tempted to have a nuncupative will by public act declared invalid
because of vices in its form.28 Both of the subscribing witnesses
testified that they did not believe that the will had been per-
fected in accordance with the requirements of Article 1578 of
the Civil Code. In reversing the trial judge, the court held that
the uncorroborated testimony of the subscribing witnesses,
which impeaches their solemn declarations that the will was
drawn and signed in the presence of the witnesses, is not legally
sufficient to invalidate the testament.20 To carry their burden
of proof, those who seek to invalidate a will by public act must
support the testimony of the subscribing witnesses with other
facts or reasonable inferences.
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
In Weems v. Medak8 0 the court held that property acquired
during the existence of the community of acquets and gains is
presumed to be community property even though it is purchased
in the name of one of the spouses. The evidence offered to prove
otherwise was not sufficient to overcome this presumption.
In Succession of Scotts' the decedent died intestate, leaving
an estate consisting entirely of funds received from the federal
government in the form of service disability payments. The
surviving spouse contended that these payments became part of
the community and therefore she was entitled to inherit her
husband's share under Article 915 of the Civil Code. Her demand
was opposed by the collateral heirs of the husband who claimed
that the payments were pure gratuities and thus became the
27. 96 BSo2d 327 (La. 1967).
28 LA. CivI CODE art. 1578 (1870).
29. Succession of Beattie, 163 La. 831, 112 So. 802 (1929).
30. 231 La. 923, 93 So.2d 217 (1957).
31. 231 La. 381, 91 So.2d 574 (1956).
[Vol. XVIII
1957] CIVIL CODE AND RELATED SUBJECTS 89
separate property of the husband. While recognizing that the
veteran had no vested right to the payments, the court held that
such payments rested upon a moral obligation of the government
to compensate the disabled veteran or his dependents for his loss
of earning power. Consequently, the payments could not be con-
sidered as purely gratuitous, and therefore constituted assets of
the community.
In Succession of Rusciana32 the heirs of the decedent spouse
sought to recover one-half of the value of certain improvements
made upon her second husband's separate property with funds
belonging to the community." The evidence showed that $10,000
of community funds had been spent in improving the property.
The court held that the actual cost of the improvements could
not be used to determine the increased value of the property.
The recovery is limited to one-half of the increase in value re-
sulting from the improvements, to be measured by value of the
property at the beginning of the community and at its dissolu-
tion.84
During the past term, the court also decided the following
cases dealing with successions, donations, and community prop-
erty. They are Gilbert v. Heintz,85 Succession of Pailet,86 Suc-
cession of Baragona,7 Succession of Franz, 8 and Balzrette v.
Hughes.3 9 These cases have been omitted from this discussion
because the decisions turned solely on questions of fact.
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
In Plummer v. Motors Insurance Corp.,' the court found the
way to substantial justice through a confused and confusing
situation. Plaintiff was the credit purchaser of a truck that had
sustained fire damage. The insurer took the truck into its pos-
session for the required repairs. Before they were made the
32. 96 So.2d 1 (La. 1957).
83. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 2408 (1870).
34. The case was remanded in order that evidence might be introduced to
establish the value of the property at the beginning of the community.
35. 231 La. 535, 91 So.2d 784 (1956).
36. 231 La. 972, 93 So.2d 235 (1957).
37. 231 La. 1016, 93 So.2d 542 (1957).
38. 232 La. 310, 94 So.2d 270 (1957).
39. 232 La. 509, 94 So.2d 649 (1957).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University..
1. 96 So.2d 605 (La. 1957).
